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This note shows that if commodities are tradable across jurisdictions, then it may be efficient
to have heterogeneously sized jurisdictions, even if (i) consumers are identical, (ii) there is
one private good and one public good, (iii) utility and production functions are not affected
by population (within the relevant range of sizes of jurisdictions).
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This note shows that if commodities are tradable across jurisdic-
tions, then it may be eﬃcient to have heterogeneously sized jurisdic-
tions, even if (i) consumers are identical, (ii) there is one private good
and one public good, (iii) utility and production functions are not
aﬀected by population (within the relevant range of sizes of jurisdic-
tions).
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the literature of local public goods economies with (i) single private good,
(ii) single public good, and (iii) identical consumers, many papers discuss the
optimal jurisdiction size, and claim that it is eﬃcient to partition the popula-
tion into identical jurisdictions of optimal size (see, for example, Pauly, 1970).
This note shows, by example, that it may not be optimal to have identically
sized jurisdictions in such a simple economy, if (1) interjurisdictional trade
of goods is allowed, and (2) marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS)
between public good and private good is not constant (constant returns to
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1scale in public good production with private good as an input). It is because
there may be gains from trade across heterogeneous jurisdictions when these
two conditions are satisﬁed.
Since many of local public goods are normally services, it is probably rea-
sonable to assume that they are not tradable across jurisdictions. In such a
case, it is easy to see that there is an optimal jurisdiction size exists (although
it is not necessarily unique). We simply need to maximize jurisdiction mem-
ber’s utility within a feasible set for a single jurisdiction. Similarly, under a
constant MRTS, there are no gains from trade, and interjurisdictional trade
does not improve welfare even if it is feasible. Thus, we can again concentrate
on autarchic allocations, and we can ﬁnd an optimal jurisdiction size again.1
However, if both of conditions (1)a n d( 2 )a r es a t i s ﬁed, there may be gains
from trade across jurisdictions. In this note, we provide a simple example
in which eﬃcient allocations involve a heterogeneous jurisdiction structure
when interjurisdictional trade is feasible. The example satisﬁes not only (i),
(ii), and (iii), but two other restrictive conditions: (iv) utility function is
concave, quasi-linear, and is not aﬀe c t e db yj u r i s d i c t i o ns i z eu pt oaq u o t a
level, and (v) cost function of public good production (in terms of private
good) is convex, and is not aﬀected by jurisdiction size.
2 The Model and an Example
Consider the following simple local public goods economy. There is one
private good and one public good, and I consumers with identical preference
and endowment. Only the private good is initially endowed, but public good
can be produced by using private good with a cost function C(y).T h i s
means that to produce y units of public good, C(y) units of private good
is needed. The technology is common to every jurisdiction. A consumer’s
net consumption vector is denoted by (x,y),w h e r ex and y represent net
consumption of private and public goods. Her utility function is denoted by
U(x,y,n) and assumed to be strictly increasing in x and y,q u a s i - c o n c a v e ,a n d
1Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski (1974) and Stiglitz (1977) assume a constant
MRTSbetween public good and private good, although jurisdiction size aﬀects production
level of these two goods: i.e., nx + y = F(n),w h e r eF(n) is production function solely
based on size of jurisdiction. Obviously, in such a case, relative price of public good in
terms of private good is ﬁxed, and there are no gains from trade. As a result, eﬃcient
allocations do not involve heterogeneously sized jurisdictions.
2quasi-linear in x,w h e r en denotes size of the population in her jurisdiction.
We assume that there is large enough private good endowment for transfer
and public good production.
A jurisdiction structure is a list of sizes of jurisdictions (n1,...,nL),
where
PL
l=1 nl = I and nl is a positive number that stands the population
(size) of jurisdiction l. Consumers who live in the same jurisdiction consume
the same amount of local public good. For simplicity, we assume equal allo-
cations of private good within a jurisdiction, that is, consumers in the same
jurisdiction consume the same amount of private good.2 A feasible alloca-
tion with interjurisdictional trade is a list ((xl,y l,n l)L
l=1) such that (i)




l=1 yl =0 ,w h e r e(xl,y l) is a net consumption
vector of a consumer in jurisdiction l.Afeasible allocation without in-
terjurisdictional trade is a list ((xl,yl,n l)L
l=1) such that (i) y ≥ 1, and (ii)
nlxl = yl for each l =1 ,...,L. Finally, a consumer’s utility is a function of her
net consumption and the size of her jurisdiction: i.e., a consumer who lives
in jurisdiction l gets utility U = U(xl,y l,n l).A noptimal jurisdiction size
without interjurisdictional trade is n∗ ≡ argmaxnU(x,y,n) s.t. nx = y.
Example. Consider the following local public goods economy. In this econ-
omy the optimal feasible allocation without interjurisdictional trade is dom-
inated by a feasible allocation with interjurisdictional trade.
1. I =4 .
2. C(y)=y if y ∈ [0,1],a n d
C(y) = 1 + 100(y − 1) if y ≥ 1.
3. U(x,y,1) = U(x,y,2) = x +0 .8y if y ∈ [0,3],
U(x,y,1) = U(x,y,2) = x +2 .4+0 .01(y − 3) if y ≥ 3,a n d
U(x,y,n)=0for n ≥ 3.3
To see this, ﬁrst consider the optimal feasible allocation without inter-
jurisdictional trade. It is easy to see that having a jurisdiction with n ≥ 3
2We assume a quasi-linear utility function, and we can show that any allocation in
any identical jurisdictional structure is ineﬃcient. We assume equal treatment only for
expositional purposes.
3We can regard n =2is the quota (upper limit population) for each jurisdiction.
Jurisdictions with sizes n ≥ 3 is not feasible (for some reason).
3does not make sense. Thus, focus on the case of n =1or n =2 .C o n -
sider the case with n =1 . Since marginal cost of production of pub-
lic good exceeds marginal rate of substitution, no production is optimal.
Thus, the resulting utility is zero. Next consider the case of n =2 .S i n c e
two people can share the marginal cost, it is optimal to produce y =1 .
Thus, n∗ =2follows, and the resulting utility level of each consumer is
U(−1
2,1,2) = 0.3. Thus, the optimal feasible allocation without interjuris-
dictional trade is ((xl,y l,n l)2
l=1)=( ( −1
2,1,2),(−1
2,1,2)) attains utility level
0.3.
Now, we allow interjurisdictional trade. Consider the following allocation
with L =3 : n1 =2and (x1,y1)=( −1.95,3),a n dn2 = n3 =1and (x2,y 2)=
(x3,y3)=( 0 .45,0): i.e., ((xl,yl,n l)3
l=1)=( ( −1.95,3,2),(0.45,0,1),(0.45,0,1)).
This allocation is feasible (each jurisdiction produces one unit of public good,
yet only two person jurisdiction consumes public good), and the resulting
utility levels are: U(−1.95,3,2) = U(0.45,0,1) = 0.45. This is higher than
0.3 attained in the previous case. What is happening is that the one person
jurisdiction produces one unit of public good and exports it to the two per-
son jurisdiction. In return, the one person jurisdiction receives 1.45 units of
private good.
3R e m a r k s
1. The latter allocation in the example above (with a heterogeneous ju-
risdiction structure) is actually a market equilibrium allocation with
interjurisdictional trade of two goods. The supporting market equilib-
rium price, the relative price of public good in terms of private good,
is 1.45.
2. Note that for any I that is an integer multiple of four, we have the
above result. Thus, even if we replicate the economy many times, we
do not get autarchic allocations with every jurisdiction size being two.
3. As the readers can easily see, the decreasing returns to scale technology
is truly essential. Although the utility and cost functions in the example
involve kinks, we can make them smooth without altering the result.
4. This example is certainly not the ﬁrst one that has the properties de-
scribed above. There are many similar/related results in club economies
4with multiple private goods.4 If we conﬁne our attention to the identi-
cal consumer case as is assumed in this note, two examples in Gilles and
Scotchmer (1997) and Wooders (2001) are particularly related. Exam-
ple 1 in Gilles and Scotchmer (1997) shows that if there are multiple
private goods and if utility functions are aﬀected by the number of
consumers in a jurisdiction, then eﬃcient allocation may involve het-
erogeneously sized jurisdictions. Wooders (2001) notes that if a club is
deﬁned as a group of people who consume identical levels of a speciﬁc
good, then the ‘gin and tonic’ example in Shapley and Shubik (1966)
can be interpreted as showing that if consumers have nonconvex pref-
erences then eﬃciency may require clubs of diﬀerent characteristics
(consumption vectors). Slightly modifying their example (changing en-
dowment only), she demonstrates that eﬃcient allocations can involve
heterogeneously sized jurisdictions. Our result is similar to these exam-
ples in club economies with multiple private goods, but we do not need
population-sensitive or nonconvex preferences. It is simply because we
have a production function to play with.
References
[1] Flatters, F.J., J.V. Henderson, and P. Mieszkowski, 1974, Public Goods,
Eﬃciency, and Regional Fiscal Equalization, Journal of Public Economics
3, 99-112.
[2] Gilles, R., and S., Scotchmer, 1997, Decentralization in Replicated Club
Economies, Journal of Economic Theory 72, 363-387.
[3] Pauly, M.V., 1970, Core and Clubs, Public Choice 9, 53-65.
[4] Shapley, L.S., and M. Shubik, 1966, Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy
with Nonconvex Preferences, Econometrica 34, 805-827.
[5] Stiglitz, J.E., 1977, The Theory of Local Public Goods, in The Economics
of Public Services, M.S. Feldstein and R.P. Inman eds., Macmillan (Lon-
don), 1977, 274-333.
4See Wooders (1999) for a survey of the literature on economies with clubs or local
public goods, including those with multiple private goods.
5[6] Wooders, M.H., 1999, Multijurisdictional economies, the Tiebout Hy-
pothesis, and sorting, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
96, 10585-10587.
[7] Wooders, M.H., 2001, Optimal clubs in Economies with Identical Agents,
mimeograph.
6